[Abstract]
We examine the association between the proportion of outside directors on the
board and the extent of tax avoidance for KOSDAQ-listed firms. As the majority
of KOSDAQ-listed firms are financially constrained, small and medium enterprises,
it is highly likely that these firms will satisfy only the minimum legal requirements
in assigning outside directors to the board. However, some firms exceed the minimum
legal requirements (i.e., one-fourth of the total number of directors). As the proportion
of outside directors increases, tax avoidance may decrease due to more effective monitoring
of the CEO. Therefore, we expect the degree of tax avoidance to decreases as
the proportion of outside directors increases. Moreover, we examine this relation
to differ by management ownership. If the manager is also a major shareholder,
as opposed to a hired professional CEO, they are more likely to avoid or restrict
outside directors¡¯ monitoring.
From a sample of KOSDAQ-listed firms, this study finds that as the proportion
of outside directors is negatively related to the degree of tax avoidance. This finding
shows that the monitoring role of outside directors is influential with respect to tax
avoidance behavior. However, the relation is weaker for firms where the management
is also the owner. This suggests that owner-managers may restrict the monitoring
activities of outside directors.
This study has two contributions. First, this study shows that outside directors
can decrease the agency cost between the managers and shareholders in terms of
tax avoidance. Second, this study infers that the monitoring effect of outside directors
can be influenced by the type of management.